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Abstract—We study a class of private information retrieval
(PIR) methods that we call one-shot schemes. The intuition
behind one-shot schemes is the following. The user’s query is
regarded as a dot product of a query vector and the message
vector (database) stored at multiple servers.
Privacy, in an information theoretic sense, is then achieved by
encrypting the query vector using a secure linear code, such as
secret sharing.
Several PIR schemes in the literature, in addition to novel
ones constructed here, fall into this class. One-shot schemes
provide an insightful link between PIR and data security against
eavesdropping. However, their download rate is not optimal, i.e.,
they do not achieve the PIR capacity. Our main contribution is
two transformations of one-shot schemes, which we call refining
and lifting. We show that refining and lifting one-shot schemes
gives capacity-achieving schemes for the cases when the PIR
capacity is known. In the other cases, when the PIR capacity
is still unknown, refining and lifting one-shot schemes gives the
best download rate so far.
I. INTRODUCTION
WE consider the problem of designing private informa-tion retrieval (PIR) schemes on coded data stored on
multiple servers that can possibly collude. In this setting, a
user wants to download a message from a server with M
messages while revealing no information about which message
it is interested in. The database is replicated on N servers,
or, in general, is stored using an erasure code, typically a
Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code. Some of these
servers could possibly collude to gain information about the
identity of the user’s retrieved message.
The PIR problem was first introduced and studied in
[1] and [2] and was followed up by a large body of work
(e.g. [3]–[8]). The model there assumes the database to be
replicated and focuses on PIR schemes with efficient total
communication rate, i.e., upload and download. Motivated
by big data applications and recent advances in the theory
of codes for distributed storage, there has been a growing
interest in designing PIR schemes that can query data that is
stored in coded form and not just replicated. For this setting,
the assumption has been that the messages being retrieved
are very large (compared to the queries) and therefore the
focus has been on designing PIR schemes that minimize
the download rate. Despite significant recent progress, the
problem of characterizing the optimal PIR download rate
(called PIR capacity) in the case of coded data and server
collusion remains open in general.
This work was supported in part by NSF Grant CCF 1817635 and presented
in part at the IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory 2018.
Related work: For replicated data, the problem of finding the
PIR capacity, i.e., minimum download rate, is solved. It was
shown in [4] and [5] that the PIR capacity is
C =
(N − T )NM−1
NM − TM
, (1)
where N is the number of servers, T is the number of
colluding servers and M is the number of messages. Capacity
achieving PIR schemes were also presented in [4] and [5].
When the data is coded and stored on a large number of
servers (exponential in the number of messages), it was shown
in [9] that downloading one extra bit is enough to achieve
privacy. In [10], the authors derived bounds on the tradeoff
between storage cost and download cost for linear coded data
and studied properties of PIR schemes on MDS data. Explicit
constructions of efficient PIR scheme on MDS data were
first presented in [11] for both collusions and no collusions.
Improved PIR schemes for MDS coded data with collusions
were presented in [12]. PIR schemes for general linear codes,
not necessarily MDS, were studied in [13]. The PIR capacity
for MDS coded data and no collusion was determined in [14],
and remains unknown for the case of collusions, the topic of
this paper. Table I summarizes the PIR capacity results known
in the literature prior to this work.
No Collusion T -Collusion
Replication C = N
M
−NM−1
NM−1
C = (N−T )N
M−1
NM−TM
(N,K)-MDS C = (N−K)N
M−1
NM−KM
R = N−K−T+1
N
TABLE I: Summary of the best known rates in the literature,
where C denotes that the rate is capacity achieving.
One of the main results of this work is improving the
achievable PIR rate for coded date with collusion from the
rate R = N−K−T+1N in the bottom right corner of Table I
to R = (N−K−T+1)N
M−1
NM−(K+T−1)M in Theorem 2. Before elaborating
more on this, we need to introduce the class of one-shot PIR
schemes.
One-Shot Schemes: A natural approach to PIR is to hide the
queries from the servers using a linear secure code. We revisit
the two-server toy-example in [1], but interpret it as a Shannon
one-time pad scheme [15].
Example 1 (One-Time Pad PIR Scheme). Suppose M single
bit messages, D1, . . . ,DM ∈ F2, are stored, replicated, onto
2One-Shot Scheme
R = N−rN
Refined Scheme
R = NN+r
Refined and
Lifted Scheme
R = (N−r)N
M−1
NM−rM
Refinement Lifting
M →∞
Fig. 1: Given a One-shot scheme we can apply the Refinement Lemma to obtain a refined scheme with a better rate forM = 2
messages. Lifting this scheme, through the Lifting Theorem, we obtain a refined and lifted scheme with better rate for any
number, M , of messages. When M →∞ the rate of the refined and lifted scheme converges to that of the one-shot scheme.
two non-colluding servers and a user is interested in retrieving
Di privately. The user can use the following scheme based
on the one-time pad, where 〈D, q〉 denotes the inner product
between the vectors D, q ∈ FM2 .
Server 1 Server 2
Queries q q + ei
Responses 〈D, q〉 〈D, q + ei〉
TABLE II: Query and response structure for hiding queries.
The queries in Table II satisfy the following properties:
• The vector q ∈ FM2 is chosen uniformly at random.
• The vector ei is the i-th vector of the standard basis of
F
M
2 .
The user can retrieve Di by summing both responses,
〈D, q〉+ 〈D, q + ei〉 = 〈D, ei〉 = Di. (2)
The scheme is private since, from any of the servers’ point of
view, the query they received is a uniformly random vector.
The PIR rate of this scheme is 1/2 since the user downloaded
2 bits, 〈D, q〉 and 〈D, q + ei〉, to retrieve 1 bit, Di.
In Example 1, the user sends two types of queries to the
servers: “noise” queries, which provide no useful information
to the user, like the query, q, sent to Server 1, and “mixed”
queries, which hide the information being retrieved from the
server, like the query, q + ei, sent to Server 2.
A one-shot scheme follows this same structure. The user
sends “noise” queries to the first r servers and “mixed”
queries to the remaining N−r servers. We call the parameter,
r, denoting the number of “noise” queries, the codimension
of the one-shot scheme. The PIR rate of a one-shot scheme
is determined by its codimension and is given by N−rN .
Contributions: In what follows, N is the number of servers,
any T of which may collude, M is the number of messages,
and the messages are stored as an (N,K)-MDS code.
Our main result is a constructive combinatorial procedure,
that we call refinement and lifting, presented in Sections IV
and V, which improves the rate of any one-shot scheme.
Theorem 1 (The Lifting Theorem). Any one-shot scheme with
co-dimension r and, consequently, rate (N − r)/N can be
refined and lifted to a PIR scheme with rate
R =
(N − r)NM−1
NM − rM
>
N − r
N
.
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Fig. 2: The schemes in Figure 1 for N = 10 and r = 7.
More so, refining and lifting one-shot schemes, we obtain
capacity-achieving schemes for the cases when the PIR capac-
ity is known and the best known rates for when the capacity
is not known.
Applying Theorem 1 to the one-shot scheme in [12], we
obtain the first PIR scheme to achieve the rate conjectured to
be optimal1 in [12] for MDS coded data with collusions.
Theorem 2. Refining and lifting the scheme presented in [12]
we obtain a PIR scheme with rate
R =
(N −K − T + 1)NM−1
NM − (K + T − 1)M
. (3)
Another interesting consequence of our procedure is that
applying it to a T -threshold linear secret sharing scheme
we obtain the same, capacity-achieving, rate as the scheme
presented in [5] but with less queries.
Theorem 3. Refining and lifting a T -threshold linear secret
sharing scheme we obtain a PIR scheme with capacity-
achieving rate
RQ =
(N − T )NM−1
NM − TM
.
1The optimality of the rate in Equation 3 was disproven in [16] for some
parameters. For the remaining range of parameters, the PIR schemes obtained
here, in Theorem 2, through refining and lifting, achieve the best rates known
so far in the literature.
3II. SETTING
A set of M messages, {W 1,W 2, . . . ,WM} ⊆ FLq , are
stored on N servers each using an (N,K)-MDS code. We
denote by W
j
i ∈ F
L/K
q , the data aboutW
j stored on server i.
Server 1 Server 2 · · · Server N
W 11 W
1
2 · · · W
1
N
W 21 W
2
2 · · · W
2
N
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
WM1 W
M
2 · · · W
M
N
TABLE III: Data stored in each server.
Since the code is MDS, each W j is determined by any
K-subset of {W j1 , . . . ,W
j
N}.
The data on server i is Di = (W
1
i , . . . ,W
M
i ) ∈ F
ML/K
q .
A linear query (from now on we omit the term linear) is a
vector q ∈ F
ML/K
q . When a user sends a query q to a server i,
this server answers back with the inner product 〈Di, q〉 ∈ Fq.
The problem of private information retrieval can be stated
informally as follows: A user wishes to download a file Wm
without leaking any information about m to any of the servers
where at most T of them may collude. The goal is for the user
to achieve this while minimizing the download cost.
The messages W 1,W 2, . . . ,WM are assumed to be inde-
pendent and uniformly distributed elements of FLq . The user is
interested in a message Wm. The index of this message, m,
is chosen uniformly at random from the set {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
A PIR scheme is a set of queries for each possible desired
message Wm. We denote a scheme by Q = {Q1, . . . ,QM}
where Qm = {Qm1 , . . . , Q
m
N} is the set of queries which
the user will send to each server when they wish to retrieve
Wm. So, if the user is interested in Wm, Qmi denotes
the set of queries sent to server i. The set of answers,
A = {A1, . . . ,AM}, is defined analogously.
A PIR scheme should satisfy two properties:
1) Correctness: H(Wm|Am) = 0.
2) T -Privacy: I(∪j∈JQ
m
j ;m) = 0, for every J ⊆ [M ] such
that |J | = T , where [M ] = {1, . . . ,M}.
Correctness guarantees that the user will be able to retrieve
the message of interest. T -Privacy guarantees that no T
colluding servers will gain any information on the message
in which the user is interested.
Definition 1. Let M messages be stored using an (N,K)-
MDS code on N servers. An (N,K, T,M)-PIR scheme is a
scheme which satisfies correctness and T -Privacy.
Note that T -Privacy implies in |Q1| = |Qi| for every i, i.e.,
the number of queries does not depend on the desired message.
Definition 2. The PIR rate of an (N,K, T,M)-PIR scheme
Q is RQ =
L
|Q1| .
The PIR rate is the reciprocal of the download cost.
III. ONE-SHOT SCHEMES
In this section, we introduce the notion of a one-shot
scheme. The main idea behind one-shot schemes is encrypting
the queries from the servers, as shown in Example 1.
In the last two subsections, we give examples of known
schemes from the literature, which we interpret as one-shot
schemes, and present new ones.
A. Definition and Examples
Throughout this paper we assume, without loss of general-
ity, that the user is interested in retrieving the first message.
We denote the subspace of queries which only query the
first message by V1 = {a ∈ F
ML/K
q : i > L/K ⇒ ai = 0}.
Definition 3 (One-Shot Schemes). An (N,K, T,M)-one-shot
scheme of codimension r is a scheme in which the queries
have the following form.
Server 1 · · · Server r Server r + 1 · · · Server N
q1 · · · qr qr+1 + a1 · · · qN + aN−r
TABLE IV: Query structure for a one-shot scheme.
The queries in Table IV satisfy the following properties:
1) The q1, . . . , qN ∈ F
ML/K
q and a1, . . . ,aN−r ∈ V1.
2) Any collection of T queries sent to the servers is uni-
formly and independently distributed.
3) The a1, . . . ,aN−r ∈ V1 are such that the responses
〈Dr+1,a1〉, . . . , 〈DN ,aN−r〉 are linearly independent.
4) For every i > r, the response 〈Di, qi〉 is a linear
combination of 〈D1, q1〉, . . . , 〈Dr, qr〉.
We refer to queries of the form q∗ + a∗ as mixed queries,
where the noisy query q∗ is hiding the informative query a∗.
Property 2 ensures T -privacy. Properties 3 and 4 ensure
correctness. The PIR rate of a one-shot scheme is a function,
solely, of its codimension and is given in Proposition 1. First,
we need the following definition.
Definition 4 (Decoding Equations). Consider the one-shot
scheme in Definition 3. Property 4 implies that, for every
i > r, there exists an equation of the form
〈Di, qi〉 = α
i
1〈D1, q1〉+ . . .+ α
i
r〈Dr, qr〉.
We call these equations, one for every i > r, the decoding
equations of the one-shot scheme.
Proposition 1. A one-shot PIR scheme, Q, of codimension r
has rate
RQ =
N − r
N
= 1−
r
N
.
Proof. For every i > r, we have a decoding equation
〈Di, qi〉 = α
i
1〈D1, q1〉+ . . .+ α
i
r〈Dr, qr〉.
We can then write, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N − r,
〈Dr+i,ai〉 = 〈Dr+i, qr+i + ai〉 − 〈Di, qi〉.
Thus, the user can retrieve the linearly independent
〈Dr+1,a1〉, . . . , 〈DN ,aN−r〉, obtaining N − r useful sym-
bols, having downloaded a total of N symbols.
4Remark 1. Technically, N − r must be divisible by L. When
this does not occur, the one-shot scheme must be repeated
lcm(N − r, L) times2. This, however, does not change the
rate of the scheme. We explain more in detail in Example 3.
The scheme in Table II is an example of a one-shot scheme
with codimension 1. We now present a more complicated
example, with codimension 2, where the data is replicated.
Example 2 (Replicated Data with Codimension 2). Suppose
M messages, W 1, . . . ,WM ∈ F23 are stored, replicated, onto
N = 4 servers, where at most T = 2 of them collude, and a
user is interested in retrieving W 1 privately. The user can use
the following one-shot scheme.
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4
q1 q2 q1 + q2 + e1 q1 + 2q2 + e2
TABLE V: Query structure for Example 2.
The queries in Table V satisfy the following properties:
• The vectors q1, q2 ∈ F
2M
3 are chosen uniformly at
random.
• The vectors e1 and e2 are the first two vectors of the
standard basis of F2M3 .
This scheme is private since for any two servers the queries
are uniformly and independently distributed.
The two decoding equations of this one-shot scheme are
〈D, q1 + q2〉 = 〈D, q1〉+ 〈D, q2〉 (4)
〈D, q1 + 2q2〉 = 〈D, q1〉+ 2〈D, q2〉. (5)
From these equations and the responses from the server, the
user can retrieve W 11 = 〈D, e1〉 and W
1
2 = 〈D, e2〉.
To retreive 2 units of information from the message the user
has to download 4. Therefore, the rate of this PIR scheme is
R = 1/2, as per Proposition 1.
In the following example we will consider a coded database
where we must take Remark 1 into account.
Example 3 (Coded Data). Suppose M messages are stored
using a (4, 2)-MDS code over F3 as in Table VI.
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4
W 11 W
1
2 W
1
1 +W
1
2 W
1
1 + 2W
1
2
W 21 W
2
2 W
2
1 +W
2
2 W
2
1 + 2W
2
2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
WM1 W
M
2 W
M
1 +W
M
2 W
M
1 + 2W
M
2
TABLE VI: Data stored in a (4, 2)-MDS code.
Suppose the user is interested in the first message and wants
2-privacy, i.e., at most 2 servers can collude. The following is
a (4, 2, 2,M)-one-shot scheme taken from [11].
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4
q1 q2 q3 q4 + e1
TABLE VII: Query structure for Example 3.
2We denote the least common multiple of N−r and L by lcm(N−r, L).
The queries in Table VII satisfy the following properties:
• The vectors q1, q2 ∈ F
M
3 are uniformly and indepen-
dently distributed.
• The vectors q3 = q1 + q2 and q4 = q1 + 2q2.
• The vector e1 is the first vector of the standard basis of
F
M
3
This scheme is private since for any two servers the queries
are uniformly and independently distributed.
The decoding equation of this one-shot scheme is
〈D4, q4〉 = −〈D1, q1〉+ 2〈D2, q2〉+ 2〈D3, q3〉. (6)
From this equation the user can retrieve W 11 + 2W
1
2 . To
retrieve 1 unit of the message the user has to download 4 units.
Therefore, the rate of the PIR scheme is R = 1/4, which could
have also been obtained from Proposition 1.
The scheme, however, does not satisfy correctness, since the
user has not retrieved the whole of W 1. To do this, we must
repeat it lcm(N − r, L) = 2 times, as stated in Remark 1.
To get a different combination we will have to change where
we introduce our mixed query. Consider the following query
structure, analagous to the one in Table 3
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4
q5 q6 q7 + e1 q8
TABLE VIII: Second part of the query structure in Example 3.
The queries in Table VII satisfy the following properties:
• The vectors q5, q6 ∈ F
M
3 are uniformly and indepen-
dently distributed.
• The vectors q7 = q5 + q6 and q8 = q5 + 2q6.
• The vector e1 is the first vector of the standard basis of
F
M
3
The decoding equation of this one-shot scheme, the same
as Equation 6, can be written as
〈D3, q3〉 = 2〈D1, q1〉 − 〈D2, q2〉+ 2〈D4, q4〉. (7)
From this equation the user can retrieve W 11 +W
1
2 . Now,
having both W 11 + 2W
1
2 and W
1
1 + W
1
2 , the user can
decode W 1. To retrieve 2 units of information the user had to
download 8 units. Thus, as mentioned in Remark 1, the rate
of the one-shot scheme is still R = 1/4.
In the rest of the paper we focus only on the first round of
queries since, as stated in Remark 1, the rate of the scheme is
not affected by the additional rounds needed for correctness.
Remark 2. The schemes in Examples 2 and 3 do not work
over the base field F2. The reason for this is that the decoding
equations 4, 5, 6, and 7 all have 2 as a coefficient. Since F2
has characteristic 2, the coefficient 2 is equal to 0.3
In general, given a one-shot scheme, the base field must
have a characteristic which is compatible with the coefficients
of the decoding equations. For simplicity, we can always
consider that the base field has characteristic larger than the
largest coefficient in the decoding equations.
3The characteristic of a field, Fq , is the smallest integer k such that, for
every x ∈ Fq , x+ . . .+ x
︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
= 0.
5B. One-Shot Schemes from the Literature
In this section, we reinterpret some schemes from the
literature as one-shot schemes. As usual, N denotes the
number of servers, T the number of colluding servers,
and M the number of messages. The messages are stored
as an (N,K)-MDS code and the user wants the first message.
Replicated Data:When the messages are replicated among the
servers, i.e. K = 1, a T -threshold linear secret sharing scheme
[17] can be transformed into the following one-shot scheme,
with codimension r = T .
Server 1 . . . Server T Server T + 1 . . . Server N
q1 qT qT+1 + e1 qN + eN−T
TABLE IX: Query structure for the secret sharing scheme.
The queries in Table IX satisfy the following properties:
• The vectors q1, . . . , qT ∈ F
M(N−T )
q are chosen uni-
formly at random.
• The vectors qT+1, . . . , qN−T ∈ F
M(N−T )
q are such that
q1, . . . , qN are a (N, T )-MDS.
• The vectors e1, . . . , eN−T are the first N −T vectors of
the standard basis of F
M(N−T )
q .
The schemes in Examples 1 and 2 are secret sharing
schemes. The rate of these schemes is given by R = N−TN ,
as per Proposition 1, and is known [4] to be asymptotically
optimal when the number of messages, M , goes to infinity.
Coded Data: The first one-shot scheme for coded databases
was presented in [11]. The scheme in Theorem 3 of the journal
version [18], in our notation, has codimension r = NK−N+TK .
An improved PIR schemes for MDS coded data with
collusions was presented in [12] which, in our notation, has
codimension r = K + T − 1.
It is easy to compare the rate of these schemes via their
codimension. The scheme in [12] outperforms the scheme in
[18] unless in the cases where either K = 1 or N = K + T .
C. Geometrical One-Shot Schemes
In this section we will present a new family of one-
shot scheme with simple constructions which we refer to as
geometrical one-shot schemes. They exist for the parameters
K = 2 or N = K + T , and have the same codimension as
the schemes in [12] but with a more elementary construction,
not requiring the use of the star product.
Construction. LetM messages be stored on N servers, using
a (N,K)-MDS code, where at most T servers collude.
Since the data is stored as an (N,K)-MDS code, there exists
unique coefficients λij such that, for every i ∈ [T ], and for
every l ∈ [K + T,N ],
Di =
K+T−1∑
j=T+1
λij(l)Dj + λ
i
l(l)Dl,
where Di is the data stored in Server i.
Suppose that
λij(l0)
λi
j
(l)
= γli , for every l ∈ [K + T,N ], where
l0 = K + T .
We present the following one-shot scheme.
Server 1 . . . Server K + T − 1 Server K + T . . . Server N
q1 qK+T−1 qK+T + e1 qN + eN−K−T+1
TABLE X: Query structure for Scheme 1.
The queries in Table X satisfy the following properties:
• The vectors q1, . . . , qT ∈ F
LM/K
q are chosen uniformly
at random.
• The vectors qT+1, . . . , qN ∈ F
LM/K
q are such that
qj =
∑T
i=1 λ
i
j(l0)qi, for every j ∈ [T + 1, N ].
• The vectors e1, . . .eN−(K+T−1) are the first N − (K +
T − 1) vectors of the standard basis of F
LM/K
q .
Proposition 2. Geometrical one-shot schemes satisfy correct-
ness and T -privacy and are, therefore, one-shot schemes.
Proof. For every l ∈ [K + T,N ],
T∑
i=1
γli〈Di, qi〉 =
T∑
i=1
γji 〈
K+T−1∑
j=T+1
λij(l)Dj + λ
i
l(l)Dl, qi〉
=
T∑
i=1

K+T−1∑
j=T+1
γliλ
i
j(l)〈Dj , qi + γ
l
iλ
i
l(l)〈Dl, qi〉


=
K+T−1∑
j=T+1
〈Dj ,
T∑
i=1
γliλ
i
j(l)qi〉+ 〈Dl,
T∑
i=1
γliλ
i
l(l)qi〉
=
K+T−1∑
j=T+1
〈Dj , qj〉+ 〈Dl, ql〉
So that we get the decoding equations
〈Dl, ql〉 =
T∑
i=1
γli〈Di, qi〉 −
K+T−1∑
j=T+1
〈Dj , qj〉
for every l ∈ [K + T,N ].
In the next example we construct a geometrical one-shot
scheme for the setting of Example 3.
Example 4. Consider the setting of Example 3. Via the
geometrical one-shot scheme described in this subsection we
obtain the following one-shot scheme.
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4
q1 q2 q3 q4 + e1
TABLE XI: Query structure for Example 4.
The queries in Table XI satisfy the following properties:
• The vectors q1, q2 ∈ F
M
3 are uniformly and indepen-
dently distributed.
• The vectors q3 = 2q1 − q2 and q4 = −q1 + q2.
• The vector e1 is the first vector of the standard basis of
F
M
3
The decoding equation of this one-shot scheme is
〈D4, q4〉 = 〈D1, q1〉+ 〈D2, q2〉 − 〈D3, q3〉. (8)
6IV. THE REFINEMENT LEMMA
In this section we present the first part of our refine and lift
operation. The refinement lemma shows how to improve the
rate of a one-shot scheme when the number of messages, M ,
is equal to 2.
One of the ideas behind the refinement lemma is to query
the messages individually. For this we will need to consider
the following linear subspaces.
Definition 5. We denote by
Vj = {b ∈ F
ML/K
q : i < (j − 1)L/K + 1 or i > jL/K ⇒ bi = 0},
the subspace of queries which only query the j-th message.
Example 5 (Refined One-Time Pad Scheme). SupposeM = 2
two-bit messages, W 1,W 2 ∈ F22, are stored, replicated, onto
two non colluding servers and a user is interested in retrieving
W 1 privately.
This setting could be solved by applying the one-shot
scheme in Example 1 with a PIR rate of r = 1/2.
Consider, however, the following scheme.
Server 1 Server 2
a1 b1 + a2
b1
TABLE XII: Query structure for Example 5.
The queries in Table XII satisfy the following properties:
• The vector b1 ∈ V2 is chosen uniformly at random and
such that 〈D, b〉 is linearly independent, which in this
case means that b 6= 0.
• The vectors a1,a2 ∈ V1 are chosen uniformly at random
and such that 〈D,a1〉 and 〈D,a2〉 are linearly indepen-
dent, which in this case means that a1 and a2 are linearly
independent.
The scheme is private since, from any of the servers’ point,
the a’s and b’s are statistically indistinguishable.
To decode W 1 the user uses the following decoding equa-
tion
〈D, b1〉+ 〈D, b1 + a2〉 = 〈D,a2〉 (9)
It is no coincidence that Equation 9 has the same form as
Equation 2. Indeed, the role of b1 is analogous to that of q in
Example 5.
Having, the linearly indepenedent, 〈D,a1〉 and 〈D,a2〉,
the user is able to decode W 1. By downloading a total of
3 bits, the user is able to privately retrieve the two bits of
W 1. Thus, the PIR rate of this scheme is R = 2/3. This rate
actually achieves the capacity for these parameters, given in
Equation 1.
Lemma 1 (The Refinement Lemma). Let Q be a one-shot
scheme of co-dimension r, with rate N−rN . Then, there exists an
(N,K, T, 2)-PIR scheme, Q′, with rate RQ′ =
N
N+r >
N−r
N .
Proof. We construct Q′ in the following way.
Server 1 · · · Server r Server r + 1 · · · Server N
a1 · · · ar ar+1 + br+1 · · · aN + bN
b1 · · · br
TABLE XIII: Query structure for the refined scheme Q′.
The queries in Table XIII satisfy the following properties:
• The vectors b1, . . . , bN ∈ V2 are chosen with the same
distribution as q1, . . . , qN ∈ F
ML/K
q from the one-
shot scheme Q but such that 〈D1, b1〉, . . . , 〈DT , bT 〉 are
linearly independent.
• The vectors a1, . . . ,aN ∈ V1 are chosen uniformly
at random but such that 〈D1,a1〉, . . . , 〈DN ,aN 〉 are
linearly independent.
The scheme is private since for any T servers the a’s and
the b’s are indistinguishable.
The decoding equations of the one-shot scheme are valid
also for the b’s. To retrieve N units of information the user
had to download N + r. Thus, the rate of the scheme is
RQ′ =
N
N + r
>
N − r
N
= RQ.
Remark 3. Since the refined scheme inherits the decoding
equations from the one-shot scheme, they will both share the
same restrictions on the base field, as discussed in Remark 2.
The larger the characteristic of the base field is, the larger
the probability that 〈D1,a1〉, . . . , 〈DN ,aN 〉 will be linearly
independent if the vectors a1, . . . ,aN ∈ V1 are chosen
uniformly at random.
Example 6 (Refined Scheme on Replicated Data). Refining
the scheme in Example 2 we get the following scheme.
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4
a1 a2 b1 + b2 + a3 b1 + 2b2 + a4
b1 b2
TABLE XIV: Query structure for Example 6.
The queries in Table XIV satisfy the following properties:
• The vectors b1, b2 ∈ V2 are chosen uniformly at random
and such that 〈D, b1〉 and 〈D, b2〉 are linearly indepen-
dent, which in this case means that b1 and b2 are linearly
independent.
• The vectors a1, . . . ,a4 ∈ V1 are chosen uniformly at
random and such that 〈D,a1〉, . . . , 〈D,a4〉 are linearly
independent, which in this case means that a1, . . . ,a4
are linearly independent.
This scheme is private since for any two servers the b’s and
a’s are indistinguishable.
The two decoding equations of this one-shot scheme are
〈D, b1 + b2〉 = 〈D, b1〉+ 〈D, b2〉 (10)
〈D, b1 + 2b2〉 = 〈D, b1〉+ 2〈D, b2〉. (11)
These equations are inherited from the one-shot scheme,
Equations 10 and 11 from Example 2.
From these equations, the user can retrieve 〈D,a3〉 and
〈D,a3〉, which together with 〈D,a1〉 and 〈D,a2〉 gives a
total of 4 units of information retrieved from a total of 6
downloaded. Thus, the PIR rate of this scheme is R = 2/3,
as per Lemma 1.
Example 7 (Refined Scheme on Coded Data). Refining the
scheme in Example 3 we get the following scheme.
7Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4
a1 a2 a3 a4 + b4
b1 b2 b3
TABLE XV: Query structure for Example 7.
The queries in Table XV satisfy the following properties:
• The vectors b1, b2 ∈ V2 are chosen uniformly at random
and such that 〈D1, b1〉 and 〈D2, b2〉 are linearly inde-
pendent.
• The vectors b3 = b1 + b2 and b4 = b1 + 2b2.
• The vectors a1, . . . ,a4 ∈ V1 are chosen uniformly at
random and such that 〈D1,a1〉, . . . , 〈D4,a4〉 are linearly
independent.
This scheme is private since for any two servers the b’s and
a’s are indistinguishable.
The decoding equation of this one-shot scheme is
〈D4, b4〉 = −〈D1, b1〉+ 2〈D2, b2〉+ 2〈D3, b3〉. (12)
This equation is inherited from the one-shot scheme, Equa-
tion 6 in Example 3.
From this equation, the user can retrieve 〈D4,a4〉, which
together with 〈D1,a1〉, 〈D2,a2〉, and 〈D3,a3〉 gives a total
of 4 units of information retrieved from a total of 7 down-
loaded. Thus, the PIR rate of this scheme is R = 4/7, as per
Lemma 1.
V. THE LIFTING THEOREM
In this section, we present our main result in Theorem 1.
We show how to extend, by means of a lifting operation, the
refined scheme on two messages to any number of messages.
Informally, the lifting operation consists of two steps: a
symmetrization step, and a way of dealing with “leftover”
queries that result from the symmetrization.
We also introduce a symbolic matrix representation for PIR
schemes which simplifies our analysis.
A. An Example of the Lifting Operation
Definition 6. A k-query is a sum of k queries, each belonging
to a different Vj , j ∈ [M ].
So, for example, if a ∈ V1, b ∈ V2, and c ∈ V3, then a is
a 1-query, a+ b is a 2-query, and a+ b+ c is a 3-query.
Consider the scheme in Example 7. We represent the
structure of this scheme, given in Table XV, by means of
the following matrix:
S2 =
(
1 1 1 2
)
. (13)
Each column of S2 corresponds to a server. A 1 in column i
represents sending all possible combinations of 1-queries of
every message to server i, and a 2 represents sending all
combinations of 2-queries of every message to server i. We
call this matrix the symbolic matrix of the scheme.
The co-dimension r = 3 tells us that for every r = 3 ones
there is N − r = 1 twos in the symbolic matrix.
Given the interpretation above, the symbolic matrix S2 can
be readily applied to obtain the structure of a PIR scheme for
any number of messages M . For M = 3, the structure is as
follows.
server 1 server 2 server 3 server 4
a1 a2 a3 a4 + b4
b1 b2 b3 a5 + c4
c1 c2 c3 b5 + c5
TABLE XVI: Query structure for M = 3 in Example XV as
implied by the symbolic matrix in Equation 13.
The queries in Table XVI satisfy the following properties:
• The ai ∈ V1, bi ∈ V2, and ci ∈ V3.
• The a’s and b’s are chosen as in Example 7.
• The c’s are chosen analogously to the b’s.
• The extra “leftover” term b5 + c5 is chosen uniformly at
random but different than zero.
The scheme in Table XVI has rate 5/12. In this scheme, the
role of b5 + c5 is to achieve privacy and does not contribute
to the decoding process. In this sense, it can be seen as
a “leftover” query of the symmetrization. By repeating the
scheme r = 3 times, each one shifted to the left, so that the
“leftover” queries appear in different servers, we can apply the
same idea in the one-shot scheme to the “leftover” queries, as
shown in Table XVII. Thus, we improve the rate from 5/12
to 16/37.
server 1 server 2 server 3 server 4
a1 a2 a3 a4 + b4
b1 b2 b3 a5 + c4
c1 c2 c3 b5 + c5
a7 a8 a9 + b9 a6
b7 b8 a10 + c9 b6
c7 c8 b10 + c10 c6
a13 a14 + b14 a11 a12
b13 a15 + c14 b11 b12
c13 b15 + c15 c11 c12
a16 + b16 + c16
TABLE XVII: Query structure for lifted version of Table XVI.
The queries in Table XVII satisfy the following properties:
• The scheme is separated into four rounds.
• In each of the first three rounds the queries behave as in
Table XVI, but shifted to the left so that the “leftover”
queries appear in different servers.
• But now, b16 + c16, b15 + c15, b10 + c10, and b5 + c5
are chosen analogously to b’s in Example 7.
More precisely, the 2-queries are chosen as follows.
• The vectors b16 + c16, b15 + c15 ∈ V2 + V3 are chosen
uniformly at random and such that 〈D1, b16 + c16〉 and
〈D2, b15 + c15〉 are linearly independent.
• The vectors b10 + c10 = (b16 + c16) + (b15 + c15) and
b5 + c5 = (b16 + c16) + 2(b15 + c15).
In this way, 〈D1,a16〉 can be retrieved using the same
decoding equation as Equation 12.
〈D1, b16 + c16〉 = 2〈D2, b15 + c15〉+ 2〈D3, b10 + c10〉
− 〈D1, b5 + c5〉
8This scheme can be represented by the following matrix4.
S3 =


1 1 1 2
1 1 2 1
1 2 1 1
3


The scheme for M = 3 messages was constructed re-
cursively using the one for 2 messages. It is this recursive
operation that we call lifting. The main idea behind the lifting
operation is that r = 3 entries with value k generateN−r = 1
entry with value k + 1 in the symbolic matrix.
Lifting S3 to S4 follows the same procedure: repeat S3
r = 3 times, each one shifted to the left, to produce N−r = 1
4-query. As a result, we obtain the following symbolic matrix.
S4 =


1 1 1 2
1 1 2 1
1 2 1 1
3
1 1 2 1
1 2 1 1
2 1 1 1
3
1 2 1 1
2 1 1 1
1 1 1 2
3
4


The queries are to be chosen analogously to the previous
examples which we describe rigorously in the next subsection.
B. The Symbolic Matrix
In this section we define the symbolic matrix precisely. To
do this, we will give a series of preliminary definitions.
In what follows, we denote by N the set of non-negative
integers, and by M(N) the set of matrices with entries in N.
If S ∈ M(N), we sometimes denote Sij by S[i, j].
Definition 7. Let S ∈ M(N) be a matrix with N columns.
The shift operation is defined as the matrix σ(S) such that
σ(S)[i, j] =
{
S[i, j + 1] if 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1,
S[i, 1] if j = n.
Example 8. If S =
(
1 2 3
4 5 6
)
, then, σ(S) =
(
2 3 1
5 6 4
)
.
Definition 8. Let S ∈ M(N) be a matrix. The set of entries
in S with value k is denoted by [k, S] = {(i, j) : S[i, j] = k}.
Example 9. If S =
(
1 2 2 1 3
4 2 3 3 2
)
, then, #[2, S] = 4,
where [2, S] = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 2), (2, 5)}.
Definition 9. We denote by ≺ the order on the set N2 given
by (i, j) ≺ (i′, j′) if either i < i′ or i = i′ and j < j′.5
Example 10. If x = (1, 2), y = (1, 3), and z = (2, 1), then
x ≺ y ≺ z.
4We omit zeros in our symbolic matrices.
5This is known in the literature as the lexicographical order.
Definition 10. Let k ∈ N. We denote by τk : N
2 → N2 the
function such that
τk(i, j) =
{
(i+ k, j − 1) if 2 ≤ j ≤ n− 1,
(i+ k,N) if j = 1.
Example 11. It holds that τ2(2, 1) = (4, 3).
Definition 11. Let B ⊆ N2. We denote by pi : 2N
2
→ 2N the
function such that pi(B) = {j ∈ N : (i, j) ∈ B}.
Example 12. If B = {(1, 3), (2, 1)}, then, pi(B) = {1, 3}.
We are ready to define the symbolic matrix.
Definition 12 (Symbolic Matrices). Let N,M, r ∈ N. The
symbolic matrix S(N,M, r), which we will denote simply by
SM , is defined recursively as follows.
S2 = (
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
N−r︷ ︸︸ ︷
2, . . . , 2) (14)
SM+1 = lift(SM ) (15)
The function lift :M(N)→M(N) is given by
lift(SM ) =


SM
σ(SM )
...
σr−1(SM )
A

 ,
where the matrix A is constructed as follows.
Let B = [M,SM ] = {b1, . . . , b#[M,SM ]}, where bi ≺ bj if
i < j.
For every i ∈ N, such that 1 ≤ i ≤ #[M,SM ], we define
the set Bi = {bi, τl(bi), . . . , τ
r−1
l (bi)}, where l is the number
of rows in SM .
Then, the matrix A has #[M,SM ] rows and N columns
and is given by
Aij =
{
0 if j ∈ pi(Bi),
M + 1 if j /∈ pi(Bi).
Example 13 (Symbolic Matrix for Coded Data). Consider the
construction in Section V-A. In this case N = 4 and r = 3.
The construction of S4 in terms of S3 takes the following
form.
S
4
=
1 1 1 2
1 1 2 1
1 2 1 1
3
1 1 2 1
1 2 1 1
2 1 1 1
3
1 2 1 1
2 1 1 1
1 1 1 2
3
4




S3
σ(S3)
σ2(S3)
A
9In the next example the matrix A takes a more complicated
form.
Example 14 (Symbolic Matrix for Replicated Data). Consider
the setting of Example 6, where N = 4 and r = 2. ForM = 2
we get the symbolic matrix
S2 =
(
1 1 2 2
)
. (16)
Following the procedure in Definition 12 the symbolic
matric S3 is given by
S3 =

 1 1 2 21 2 2 1
A

 .
The set B = [2, S2] = {(1, 3), (1, 4)}. Setting b1 = (1, 3)
and b2 = (1, 4), then, b1 ≺ b2.
Since τ1(b1) = (2, 2) and τ1(b2) = (2, 3) it follows that
B1 = {(1, 3), (2, 2)} and B2 = {(1, 4), (2, 3)}.
Since pi(B1) = {3, 4} and pi(B2) = {2, 3}, it follows that
A =
(
3 3
3 3
)
and therefore,
S3 =


1 1 2 2
1 2 2 1
3 3
3 3

 . (17)
We will now determine S4 using S3. We will re-use the
same variables as before so that they are in accordance with
Definition 12. We have that
S3 =


1 1 2 2
1 2 2 1
3 3
3 3
1 2 2 1
2 2 1 1
3 3
3 3
A


.
The set B = [3, S3] = {b1, . . . , b4} where b1 = (3, 1),
b2 = (3, 4), b3 = (4, 1), and b4 = (4, 2).
The sets B1 = {(3, 1), (7, 4)}, B2 = {(3, 4), (7, 3)}, B3 =
{(4, 1), (8, 4)}, and B4 = {(4, 2), (8, 1)}.
The sets pi(B1) = {1, 4}, pi(B2) = {3, 4}, pi(B3) = {1, 4},
and pi(B4) = {1, 2}, so that,
A =


4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4


and therefore,
S4 =


1 1 2 2
1 2 2 1
3 3
3 3
1 2 2 1
2 2 1 1
3 3
3 3
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4


. (18)
C. Interpreting the Symbolic Matrix.
In this section we explain how to transform a symbolic
matrix into a PIR scheme.
Definition 13. Let SM be a symbolic matrix. The query
structure of the symbolic matrix is obtained as follows. Each
entry k in the symbolic matrix SM represents
(
M
k
)
k-queries,
one for every combination of k messages.
Example 15. The query structure of the symbolic matrix, S2,
in Example 14 is given in the following table.
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4
a1 a2 a3 + b3 a4 + b4
b1 b2
TABLE XVIII: Query structure for S2 in Example 14.
The query structure of the symbolic matrix, S3, in Example
14 is given in the following table.
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4
a1 a2 a3 + b3 a5 + b5
b1 b2 a4 + c3 a6 + c5
c1 c2 b4 + c4 b6 + c6
a8 a9 + b9 a11 + b11 a7
b8 a10 + c9 a12 + c11 b7
c8 b10 + c10 b12 + c12 c7
a13 + b13 + c13 a14 + b14 + c14
a15 + b15 + c15 a16 + b16 + c16
TABLE XIX: Query structure for S3 in Example 14.
We need now to specify the distribution of the queries. We
do this recursively on the number of messages.
For M = 2 messages we choose the distribution of the
queries as in Lemma 1.
For M = 3, the query structure for the symbolic matrix S2
is as follows.
Server 1 · · · Server r Server r + 1 · · · Server N
a1 · · · ar ar+1 + br+1 · · · a2N−1 + b2N−1
b1 · · · br ar+2 + cr+1 · · · a2N + c2N−1
c1 · · · cr br+2 + cr+2 · · · b2N + c2N
TABLE XX: Query structure for S2 when M = 3.
We call the queries of the form b∗ + c∗ leftovers. If we
ignore the leftovers we can choose the b’s with the same
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distribution as in the case of M = 2, and choose the c’s
with the same distribution as the b’s. In this way, all the a’s
in Table XX can be decoded via the decoding equations of the
one-shot scheme.
We can do the same for each matrix S2, . . . , σ
r−1(S2).
Thus, in the symbolic matrix S3 each entry of value 2 has a
corresponding leftover query. Using the notation of Definition
12 there is one leftover query per entry in the set B.
Each entry of value 3 in the matrix A corresponds to a
query of the form a∗+ b∗+ c∗. Consider the leftover queries
corresponding to the entries in the set Bi. If we choose the
leftover queries corresponding to Bi together with the terms
b∗ + c∗ corresponding to {(i, j) : Aij = 3} with the same
distribution as the b’s in Lemma 1, we can decode each one
of the a’s in the i-th row of A.
The same procedure is carried out for M = 4, 5, . . .
Example 16. The queries in Table XIX satisfy the following
properties:
• The ai ∈ V1, bi ∈ V2, and ci ∈ V3.
• The vectors a1, . . . ,a16 ∈ V1 are chosen uniformly at
random and such that 〈D,a1〉, . . . , 〈D,a16〉 are linearly
independent, which in this case means that a1, . . . ,a16
are linearly independent.
• The vectors b1, b2, b3, b5 ∈ V2, b8, b9, b11, b7 ∈ V2,
c1, c2, c3, c5 ∈ V3, and c8, c9, c11, c7 ∈ V3 are chosen
with the same distribution as b1, . . . , b4 in Example 6.
• The vectors b13+c13, b10+c10, b4+c4, b14+c14 ∈ V2+
V3 and b15+c15, b16+c16, b12+c12, b6+c6 ∈ V2+V3
are chosen with the same distribution as b1, . . . , b4 in
Example 6.
To find the rate of the lifted scheme we need to count the
number of entries in the symbolic matrix of a specific value.
Proposition 3. Let SM be the symbolic matrix of a one-shot
scheme with co-dimension r. Then,
#(k, SM ) =
(
N − r
r
)k−1
rM−1 1 ≤ k ≤M
Proof. It follows from the lifting operation that
#(k, SM ) =
N − r
r
#(k − 1, SM )
=
(
N − r
r
)k−1
#(1, SM )
=
(
N − r
r
)k−1
rM−1.
Theorem 1 (The Lifting Theorem). Let Q be a one-shot
scheme of co-dimension r. Then, refining and lifting Q gives
an (N,K, T,M)-PIR scheme Q′ with rate
RQ′ =
(N − r)NM−1
NM − rM
=
N − r
N
(
1−
(
r
N
)M) .
Proof. Given the one shot-scheme Q, we apply the refinement
lemma to obtain a scheme with symbolic matrix S2 as in
Equation 14. The scheme Q′ is defined as the one with
symbolic matrix SM = lift
M−2(S2) as in (15).
6 Privacy and
correctness of the scheme follow directly from the privacy and
correctness of the one-shot scheme.
Next, we calculate the rate RQ′ =
L
|Q′1|
. Each entry k of
SM corresponds to
(
M
k
)
k-queries, one for each combination
of k messages. Thus, using Proposition 3,
|Q′
1
| =
M∑
k=1
#(k, SM )
(
M
k
)
= rM−1
M∑
k=1
(
N − r
r
)k−1(
M
k
)
=
NM − rM
N − r
To find L we need to count the queries which query W1.
The number of k-queries which query W1 is
(
M−1
k−1
)
. Thus,
L =
M∑
k=1
#(k, SM )
(
M − 1
k − 1
)
= rM−1
M∑
k=1
(
N − r
r
)k−1 (
M − 1
k − 1
)
= NM−1
Therefore, RQ′ =
(N−r)NM−1
NM−rM .
VI. REFINING AND LIFTING KNOWN SCHEMES
In this section, we refine and lift known one-shot schemes
from the literature.
We first refine and lift the scheme described in Theorem 3
of [18]. In our notation, this scheme is a one-shot scheme with
co-dimension r = NK−N+TK .
Theorem 4. Refining and lifting the scheme presented in
Theorem 3 of [18] gives an (N,K, T,M)-PIR scheme Q with
RQ =
(N + T ).(NK)M−1
(NK)M − (NK −N + T )M
. (19)
Next, we refine and lift the scheme in [12]. In our notation,
this scheme has co-dimension r = K + T − 1. Thus, we
obtain the first PIR scheme to achieve the rate conjectured to
be optimal7 in [12] for MDS coded data with collusions.
Theorem 2. Refining and lifting the scheme presented in [12]
gives an (N,K, T,M)-PIR scheme, Q, with
RQ =
(N −K − T + 1)NM−1
NM − (K + T − 1)M
=
1− K+T−1N
1−
(
K+T−1
N
)M . (20)
The rate of the scheme in Theorem 4, Equation 19, is upper
bounded by the rate of the scheme in Theorem 2, Equation
20, with equality when either K = 1 or N = K + T .
6The power in the expression liftM−2(S2) denotes functional composition.
7The optimality of the rate in Equation 20 was disproven in [16] for some
parameters. For the remaining range of parameters, the PIR schemes obtained
here in Theorem 2, through refining and lifting, achieve the best rates known
so far in the literature.
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Now, we consider the case of replicated data (K = 1) on N
servers with at most T collusions. A T -threshold linear secret
sharing scheme [17] can be transformed into the following
one-shot PIR scheme.
Server 1 . . . Server T Server T + 1 . . . Server N
q1 qT qT+1 + a1 qN + aN−T
TABLE XXI: The T -threshold linear secret sharing scheme.
Theorem 3. Refining and lifting a T -threshold linear secret
sharing scheme gives an (N, 1, T,M)-PIR scheme Q with
capacity-achieving rate
RQ =
(N − T )NM−1
NM − TM
.
This scheme has the same capacity achieving rate as the
scheme presented in [5] but with less queries.
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